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PROSELYTISM AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM IMPROPER 
IRRELIGIOUS INFLUENCE: THE EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION 
SA de Freitas 
1 Introduction 
The words "proselytism" and "proselytise" descend from a Greek word proselutos, 
meaning "one who has come to a place" or "one who comes over". Jurisprudentially 
speaking, proselytism is a concept within the larger genus of the protection of 
religious rights and freedoms, and lends itself to differing opinions.1 There are also 
different insights into proselytism emanating from the various traditional religions 
and the plethora of denominations within each.2 However, a substantial school of 
thinking assumes that proselytism can take place only in a religious context. 
Lawrence Uzzell comments: "We live in an age of persuasion, in which we are 
bombarded by political and commercial messages designed to change our thoughts 
and actions, but the unfavourable term 'proselytism' is reserved for specifically 
religious persuaders."3 Uzzell adds that "[s]ecular specialists on human rights and 
international law, even those who defend freedom of conscience, now use the word 
'proselytism' to mean any attempt by any religious believer to win converts from 
other religions or from irreligion".4 
The question arises whether improper proselytism is relevant only to "religious forms 
of improper influence" and excludes other forms of "improper belief influence". It is 
argued in the article that influencing the beliefs of someone improperly can include a 
kind of proselytising action pertaining to a belief, which is not only religious by 
nature but also of one that is irreligious. In addition to improper "religious" 
proselytism, improper proselytism should include an understanding of improper 
                                        
  SA de Freitas. BProc LLB LLM (UFS). Associate Professor, Department of Constitutional Law and 
Philosophy of Law, University of the Free State. Email: defreitas@ufs.ac.za 
1  Garnett 2005 USTLJ 465-466. 
2  See for example Witte and Martin Sharing the Book. 
3  Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism. 
4  Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism. 
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"irreligious" proselytism. This article illustrates this understanding by means of the 
risks embedded in exclusively irreligious public education and teaching.5 
2 The right to freedom of religion, belief and education  
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights6 and the European Convention on  
Human Rights7 it is clear that freedom of thought is a basic right of "everyone". 
There is no age limit at which people begin to enjoy such a legal right. Young 
persons (and therefore pupils) have a right to freedom of thought. This right is 
important in the context of school education, where a student's freedom of thought 
may be restricted by ideological indoctrination.8 Article 5(1)(b) of the Convention 
against Discrimination in Education places the emphasis on the protection of a 
person's (or group's) convictions as well as the protection of the liberty of parents to 
have their children morally educated in accordance with their convictions.9  
                                        
5  By this it is not implied that there are no public institutions in democratic and plural societies 
where religious knowledge is forced upon irreligious recipients. Nonetheless, the focus of this 
article is on those public teaching institutions in so-called democratic and plural societies, such as 
schools, where irreligious forms of knowledge are forced upon irreligious recipients. Needless to 
say, the argument presented in this article will also be of value to instances where religious 
knowledge is forced upon an irreligious recipient, or where a religion is forced upon a recipient 
loyal to another religion. 
6  Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states: "Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." 
7  Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which states: "Everyone has 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance." This 
reads exactly the same as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
8  Clarke 1986 ICLQ 271. Neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights nor the European 
Convention on Human Rights explicitly acknowledges the rights of children to freedom of 
thought in schools. The UN Declaration (Article 26(3)) provides that "parents have a prior right 
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children". A similar principle 
concerning the relative priority of parents' rights, is expressed by Article 2 of the Protocol 1 to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1952) 271. From this it is clear that although the 
right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by the European Convention to everyone, the 
education initiatives of the state are explicitly limited only by reference to the "religious and 
philosophical conviction" of parents. 
9  The Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), Article 5(1)(b): "The States Parties 
to this Convention agree that: (b) It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where 
applicable, of legal guardians … to ensure in a manner consistent with the procedures followed 
in the State for the application of its legislation, the religious and moral education of the children 
in conformity with their own convictions; and no person or group of persons should be compelled 
to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their convictions." 
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Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 1 
and 6 of the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief may be affected by coercion or through 
religious persons being subjected to preaching that harm their beliefs.10 The 
provisions of Article 19(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
concerning the right to hold opinions without interference include the understanding 
that religious persons may not wish to be exposed to any type of indoctrination in 
any form.11 Protocol 1 of Article 2 of the European Convention and Article 18(4) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deal with the liberty of 
parents and/or legal guardians to ensure that the religious and moral education of 
their children conforms to their own convictions. This should be read in conjunction 
with Article 13(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.12 Article 51(a) of the UNESCO Convention reaffirms the right of parents or 
legal guardians to ensure "the religious and moral education of the children in 
conformity with their own convictions, and no person or group of persons should be 
compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their conviction".13 
The issue of religious freedom at public schools is a controversial contemporary 
concern. At the annual sessions of the United Nation's Human Rights Council, the 
topic of religious instruction within the framework of the fundamental right to 
religious freedom is constantly on the agenda for discussion and resolution. The 
question regularly asked is if religious instruction should take place at public schools 
and, if so, how it should be implemented to do justice to the fundamental right to 
religious freedom in a constitutional state.14 Stephen Carter states: "Too many of 
today's theorists of liberalism … seem determined to use 'public' education to create 
a nation where everybody thinks the same way."15 In this quest towards universal 
                                        
10  Lerner 1998 EILR 484. Lerner's referral to "preaching that harms their beliefs" is not sufficiently 
nuanced. Here one would rather talk about some form of "coerced preaching" as preaching per 
se is not necessarily coerced. 
11  Lerner 1998 EILR 484. 
12  Lerner 1998 EILR 514-515. 
13  Lerner 1998 EILR 539. 
14  Vorster 2010 NGTT 205. Here one needs to be careful in presenting the idea that public schools 
are connoted to only that which is irreligious. 
15  Carter 1997 SHLR 1224. 
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thinking there are those who take the view that "religious" content should be 
removed from teaching at public institutions. This endeavour to remove religion from 
teaching at public schools assumes that teaching can be divorced from religion and, 
therefore, that such teaching is belief free. In a truly democratic and plural society, 
public schools need to accommodate a wide range of cultural and religious 
backgrounds, which precludes their organisation in accordance with any thick 
concept of the good.16 
The positivistic preoccupation in education with "elements of reality alone" or with 
the mere accumulation of "empirical facts" obstructs the relevance of these facts in 
their relation to human life in its totality.17 Reverence for facts and the acquisition of 
scientific knowledge (in an exclusive manner) result in a national system of 
education that provides its students with manifold simplistic "answers", but is always 
painfully lacking in profound questions.18 This positivism is also similar to humanist 
approaches towards education, which support the view that the scientific method is 
applicable to all areas of human concern, and is the only valid means for 
determining truth.19 In many instances, school authorities, although not setting out 
to promote irreligious worldviews, have an underlying worldview of modern 
education that divorces humankind from its dependence on religious answers to 
many of the ultimate questions of human existence with irreligious answers. In this 
regard, irreligious education gives irreligious answers to ultimate questions and 
conveys its irreligious understanding of reality essentially as a matter of faith.20 Just 
as there is a risk for a public school to place too much emphasis on a specific 
religious component in its teaching, there is the risk of a public school substantially 
withdrawing the religious element from its teaching curriculum. This has implications 
for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be understood, 
where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper influence.  
                                        
16  De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 183. Also see Vischer Conscience and the Common Good 103. 
17  Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 146. Moral perspectives cannot be avoided. The 
very selection of curriculum materials (implicitly or explicitly) imports concepts of the moral 
nature of culture and society. What is deemed important and essential to know has strong moral 
dimensions, though these dimensions often fail to rise to the level of articulation. 
18  Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 147. 
19  In this regard see McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 126-127. 
20  Greenawalt 2002 JLP 336. Also see McGarry 1983 CL 7. 
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Iain Benson comments:21 
Just as it is an error to use 'faith' as a code word for religious faith because of our 
various forms of 'faith', and to continue to speak in blanket fashion of 'unbelievers' 
so it is an error to view a non-religious form of public education as one lacking 
'faith' commitments. 
Added to this is the erroneous understanding that "the public" is divorced from all 
religious content. The term "public education" is popularly understood in liberal 
societies in a manner that suggests that "religious education" is to be excluded from 
the public, and that "public education" means "irreligious education". In the words of 
Iain Benson, "A division between education called public and religious education also 
implies, if it does not expressly state it, that a bright-line exists between something 
we call the 'public' and something else, in this case education that is religious".22 
This misconception of "the public", implying a sphere devoid of all religious 
discourse, could lead to "secular intolerance", where the state sets out to cleanse 
the public sphere from any actual reference to religious beliefs and practice.23 This 
understanding that religion is a highly privatised matter poses the risk of creating an 
understanding of proselytism that is restricted to religious expression only. As soon 
as religion raises its head in the public domain, attempts are made at stifling it, lest 
it would overstep its "private" boundaries and hinder the so-called neutral space of 
the public. Consequently, irreligious forms of expression in the public domain (which 
includes public schools) and their potentially manipulative proselytising influence 
occur unchecked. This is also evident in the plethora of jurisprudence and case law 
where proselytism is dealt with mainly under the banner of "the religious". Another 
reason as to why "the irreligious" might seem foreign to proselytism is liberalism's 
understanding, in the context of education, of the idea that faith and rational 
reflection are mutually exclusive. This ignores the fact that no proof of anything can 
be so completely drawn as to eliminate its dependence on undemonstrable givens. 
When an individual relies on whatever constitutes his or her ultimate concern, this 
                                        
21  Benson "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?" 6. Also see Benson 2000 UBCLR 541 and Benson 
2010 JSR 22, 25. 
22  Benson "Are Religious Schools Public Schools?" 1-2, 18-19, 26-27. 
23  Martinez-Torrόn and Navarro-Valls 1998 HM 36. Also see Copley 2008 JREA 22. 
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constitutes an act of faith.24 Therefore, where ultimate concerns rest on irreligious 
beliefs, then such ultimate concerns also stand the risk of being used in a 
manipulative manner. Therefore, in education the irreligious can also result in 
improper proselytism. 
This dialectic between the religious and the irreligious in education becomes more 
fraught when the question of pupils' moral education is raised. In some courses, 
texts and teachers adopt a "values clarification" approach to moral issues, 
suggesting that pupils need to clarify and choose their values. Values clarification in 
its usual form is diametrically opposed to the belief that moral standards derived 
from religion are absolutely binding.25 When the religious view is excluded from the 
entire curriculum, students may come to the conclusion that religion is somehow less 
then acceptable or a private matter not to be discussed openly.26 In the context of 
courses such as social studies, history, current events, literature, health, hygiene, 
home economics and family living, typically a question is posed, diverse alternatives 
are suggested and considered, and the problem is freely discussed.27 Arguments and 
factors of various types – with the exception of religious considerations – are raised 
and analysed, and both individual and group solutions are arrived at on an entirely 
secular basis.28 This subtly provides an aggressive and intolerant approach towards 
anything religious and allows other beliefs (irreligious) in its place. In a study of 
textbooks in Missouri in America, for example, it was found that there are few 
theistic references in textbook descriptions of present-day life and literature. In this 
we find the inculcation of humanism (which represents a central belief system) by 
elimination of theism.29 Needless to say, it is not only in Missouri where theistic 
references in textbook descriptions are substantially limited. This also has 
                                        
24  Budziszewski True Tolerance 130-131. 
25  Greenawalt 2002 JLP 338. This emphasis on values also overlaps with humanism's emphasis on 
cultural relativism, in other words the belief that values are grounded only in a given culture and 
have no transcultural normativity. In this regard, see McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 
128. 
26  Wilson 2003 TRLP 424. 
27  McGarry 1983 CL 5-6. 
28  McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 127. For example, the fact that Martin Luther King 
was a pastor and that the black churches played a key role are ignored in political events of 
particular importance, such as the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955-56.  
29  McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 122. Also see McGarry 1983 CL 6. 
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implications for how the irreligious dimension of improper proselytism should be 
understood, where irreligious knowledge stands the risk of exercising improper 
influence. 
A central task of public schools in a democratic and plural dispensation is to transmit 
and reproduce the specific cultural, religious and political traditions of the 
communities they serve. A school that takes this task seriously, whilst simultaneously 
adopting a posture of strict neutrality by means of any secular or religious 
worldview, is oxymoronic.30 There is a problem in education in defining neutrality, 
because making a neutral choice in education is making a choice.31 Neutrality, when 
applied as a principle, holds that other principles (for example, those based on 
religious convictions) may not be included or even accommodated. It is this kind of 
purported "strict neutrality" which feeds a positivistic approach into school 
education. The argument against a neutral education can be understood by 
reference to Nagel's more general claim that liberal theory is non-neutral, because it 
discounts conceptions that depend on interpersonal relations. Indeed, the family, 
and particularly the parental bond, constitutes such relations, ignored by the call for 
religiously neutral education.32 In fact, the "neutral" law will inevitably collide with 
the moral obligations of individuals, especially in cases where the state assumes the 
prerogative to organise the curricula of schools without considering the religious or 
philosophical convictions of parents in the pursuit of supposed "neutrality".33 Against 
the background of Lautsi and Others v Italy, where the ECtHR dealt with whether 
crucifixes could be displayed in classrooms, Wouter De Been comments that:34 
… a growing body of evidence … suggests that it is impossible to section off a 
distinct category of artefacts that sends out a symbolic meaning from another set of 
objects that does not. Our experience of the world is inescapably qualitative, 
drenched in emotive and aesthetic meaning. Consequently, taking away the cross 
will not result in an absence of symbols, but in a symbol of absence, a symbolic 
absence of religion within a ring-fenced space created by a secular initiative. 
                                        
30  De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 183. 
31  Scolnicov, cited in Langlaude 2006 ICLQ 935. 
32  Scolnicov 2007 IJCR 260. 
33  Martinez-Torrόn and Navarro-Valls 1998 HM 32-33. 
34  De Been "Quest for Neutrality" 182. Also see Copley 2008 JREA 31. 
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The same applies to efforts in many liberal paradigms towards ridding public 
education from anything religious. Having therefore looked at religion and belief in 
teaching, its protection in human rights instruments, the understanding that religion 
forms part of the public domain, as well as to how, for example, the teaching of 
positivist values and calls for neutrality introduce a dominant irreligious influence in 
the classroom, the relevance of improper proselytism to such irreligious teaching is 
investigated next. 
3 The irreligious as improper proselytism in teaching 
The potential of improper proselytism finds special relevance in matters related to 
the nature and parameters of the teaching at school of specific modules such as 
history, literature, physics, biology, and life skills. In this regard, the overlap 
between a predominantly irreligious education and "inappropriate", "coercive" or 
"manipulative" forms of proselytism is investigated, and here the risk of improper 
proselytism as the coercion of learners towards exclusively irreligious influences is 
addressed. It is in this regard that positivism, the teaching of values and calls for 
neutrality (referred to earlier) in education pose risks of improperly influencing 
pupils. Scholarship on improper irreligious proselytism and, more specifically, the 
improper influence of the teaching of irreligious knowledge at public schools have 
received little attention in human rights scholarship. 
For the purposes of this article an understanding similar to Ted Stahnke's 
understanding of proselytism is applied, namely that proselytism is "expressive 
conduct undertaken with the purpose of trying to change the religious beliefs, 
affiliation, or identity of another".35 However, an important addition is suggested 
here (and as mentioned earlier), namely that not only should proselytism be linked 
to the changing of religious beliefs, but also of irreligious beliefs.36 This is also 
                                        
35  Stahnke 1999 BYULR 255. 
36  In Kokkinakis v Greece ECtHR No 14307/88, 25 May 1993, Judge Pettiti, in his partly concurring 
opinion in this well-known proselytism case in the ECtHR, states that the reasoning of the 
judgment could also have better reflected the fact that Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (referred to earlier) also applies to irreligious philosophical beliefs (author's 
emphasis). 
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supported by dictionary meanings ascribed to the term "proselytise".37 Proselytism 
understood as a form of persuasive38 expression should include not only religious, 
but also belief expressions.39 Why should "persuasive expression" be limited only to 
religious beliefs and not non-religious beliefs as well? 
In international human rights there is no definitive consensus about whether 
proselytism is a manifestation of religion or belief and therefore encompassed within 
the concept of the right to freedom of religion or belief.40 This lack of any direct 
recognition of proselytism may be an indication of the sensitivity of states to the 
issues it raises and the difficulty of delineating agreeable standards.41 Prohibitions on 
proselytism have been enacted regarding the exertion of influence on people whose 
capacities or circumstances render them vulnerable. This is understood as a form of 
improper manipulation.42 It is interesting to note that this form of manipulation 
applies almost solely to the conversion of religious beliefs. The manipulation of other 
ideas and beliefs in similar circumstances (ranging from political persuasion to the 
                                        
37  Stevenson Oxford Dictionary 1427: "Convert or attempt to convert someone from one religion, 
belief, or opinion to another"; Simpson and Weine Oxford English Dictionary 664: "to cause to 
come over or turn from one opinion, belief, creed, or party to another". 
38  Garnett 2005 USTLJ 457. 
39  Uzzell 2004 http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-122989524/don-t-call-it-proselytism. It is 
interesting to note that the term proselytism had a meaning beyond that of the religious during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For example, Edmund Burke in 1790 applied it to the 
anti-Christian philosophes of the French Enlightenment. 
40  Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275. 
41  Stahnke 1999 BYULR 275: However, here it is important to note that the essence of the 
"freedom of religion", as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in its first case about religion, 
namely R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 1985 CANLII 69, [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada), is that the right 
not only encompasses the right to hold a belief in private, but inter alia the right to "manifest", 
"teach" and "disseminate" it. Thus, these things cannot really be offences against others as long 
as they do not spill over into "coercion". 
42  Referring to the ECtHR's view in the Larissis v Greece ECtHR No 140/1996/759/958-960, 24 
February 1998 judgement, Stijn Smet states that: "… if the addressee finds herself in a 
particularly vulnerable relationship towards the proselytiser, who in turn stands in a position of 
authority or power vis-à-vis the addressee, measures may be taken to protect the latter's 
autonomy, provided it is effectively impaired. However, if the proselytism does not impair the 
addressee's autonomy, the conflict is decided in favour of the proselytiser" (Stijn "Freedom of 
Religion v Freedom from Religion" 119). The manipulation of the addressee or the exertion of an 
improper influence of a belief (whether religious or non-religious) on an addressee can also be 
linked to practices where a specific belief is conveyed to the recipient or addressee (who is in a 
vulnerable position), thereby excluding any other belief that might be of fundamental importance 
to that recipient. This in turn has the potential to result in an improper form of proselytism 
towards the recipient. Where the proselytiser is in a position of influence and authority and the 
addressee is vulnerable, then the withholding of valuable information can constitute a form of 
manipulation. This is of special relevance to the relationship between teacher and pupil. 
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inducement to purchase products by means including advertising) generally remains 
legal and even desirable in a society predicated on a free marketplace of ideas. This 
distinction between the change of religious beliefs and change of any other belief 
lacks any coherent justification,43 though it may be said that it does support 
arguments about the dominance of coercive fundamentally anti-religious irreligious 
understandings. 
The wider understanding of the protection and limitation of religious belief, which is 
reflected in regional human rights instruments and in the constitutions of many 
democratic and plural countries, understands such protection and limitation to 
include irreligious beliefs as well.44 Therefore, when we talk of freedom of religion 
and freedom from improper religious influence, then this also includes freedom of 
irreligious beliefs and freedom from improper influence by irreligious beliefs. 
Preventing the "proselytiser" from expressing her religious or irreligious beliefs may 
violate her freedom to manifest her belief, whilst the recipient or addressee may 
argue that the "proselytiser" may not improperly interfere with her freedom to hold a 
religious or irreligious belief. 
Fortunately, the ECtHR has taken a wide or inclusive approach to the definition of 
religion. According to the ECtHR, religion includes claims concerning scientology, 
druidism, pacifism, communism, atheism, pro-life, Divine Light Zentrum, and the 
Moon Sect.45 The ECtHR case law tends to revolve around the definition of "belief" 
rather than that of "religion", and the term "belief" is considered in its jurisprudence 
to require a worldview rather than a mere opinion.46 An understanding of "religion" 
as including both belief and disbelief of a certain type makes the notion broad 
enough to include even the religiously "neutral" values inculcated at state schools. In 
this regard, there is a sound basis for the objections of those arguing that irreligious 
                                        
43  Scolnicov Right to Religious Freedom 199-200. 
44  See for example, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) Article 9; the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 section 15; the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
1982 section 2; the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights (1981) Article 8; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 18; the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). 
45  Hill "Bracelets, Rings and Veils" 310-311. 
46  Hill "Bracelets, Rings and Veils" 311. 
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schools are not neutral with respect to religion; they implicitly endorse one type of 
religion (which is humanism) to the exclusion of others. In doing this, they violate 
the freedom of thought of pupils who are educated at public schools.47 
One of the pioneers of educational psychology, John Dewey, explained that the 
morals of pupils are influenced by the school's curriculum, which is the moral 
environment found at all schools, conveyed by the school rules, the moral 
orientation of school staff, and text materials.48 Courts appear to have accepted that 
teachers exert an influence over pupils not only through the advice or through 
instruction they give but also by the example set. As the Canadian Supreme Court 
observed in Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15, "[t]eachers occupy 
positions of trust and confidence, and exert considerable influence over their 
students as a result of their position".49 The Court quotes Canadian legal academic 
Allison Reyes:50 
Teachers are a significant part of the unofficial curriculum because of their 
status as 'medium'. In a very significant way, the transmission of prescribed 
'messages' (values, beliefs, knowledge) depends on the fitness of the 
'medium' (the teacher). 
Alison Mawhinney states that the susceptibility of children to a pervasive message 
presented in an uncritical manner is a fact recognised by the ECtHR, which has 
consistently drawn attention to the impressionable age of children.51 Bearing this in 
mind, there can be no reason why the teaching of knowledge by a teacher to pupils 
cannot meet the requirements for improper proselytism, where the "attributes of the 
source and the target"52 are such that the target may not be able to exercise free 
choice in accepting or resisting the change in beliefs emanating from the source.53  
                                        
47  Clarke 1986 ICLQ 299. 
48  Santrock Educational Psychology 100. 
49  Lenta 2009 SALJ 853. 
50  Lenta 2009 SALJ 853. 
51  Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 107. 
52  For more on these requirements see Stahnke 1999 BYULR 327-330. 
53  Stahnke comments that it is a basic assumption that a person should be able to make a 
considered and unrestrained choice in matters of religious belief and affiliation. Therefore, the 
more proselytism interferes with that ability to choose freely, the more the regulatory power of 
the state may be attracted, Stahnke 1999 BYULR 327. 
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Roland Pierik proposes that, in the context of school education, there should be an 
evaluation as to the extent to which the curriculum is conveyed in an objective, 
critical and plural manner and in an atmosphere free of proselytism. This requires an 
assessment of the way in which the curriculum is drafted, and whether certain 
elements give rise to a reasonable doubt regarding whether or not the curriculum is 
violating the requirements of objectivity and pluralism.54 In addition, it was stated in 
a judgement by the ECtHR, namely that of Folgerø and Others v Norway that:55 
… the competent authorities have a duty to take the utmost care to see to it that 
parents' religious and philosophical convictions are not disregarded at this level by 
carelessness, lack of judgement or misplaced proselytism. 
Until recently, according to Mawhinney, the requirement for conveying religious or 
philosophical knowledge in an "objective, critical and plural manner" and the 
prohibition on the aim of indoctrination constituted the two core principles applied in 
cases arising under Article 2 of Protocol I56 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights. However, with the 2006 ECtHR decision in Sefika Köse v Turkey,57 an 
additional standard was added, namely the requirement of the State to maintain an 
atmosphere free of any proselytism at schools.58 Mawhinney comments that, 
arguably, in the Zengin case, the ECtHR could have relied solely on the "objective, 
critical and plural" standard to reach its conclusion, but it chose instead to restate 
the Köse norm, which places a duty on States to ensure that proselytism does not 
take place at schools.59 The ECtHR has warned schools that they have to be alert to 
circumstances under which teachers might use their influence over students as an 
occasion for improper proselytism.60 
                                        
54  Pierik "State Neutrality" 207. 
55  Temperman "Religious Symbols" 164. 
56  "No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it 
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical 
convictions." 
57  Sefika Köse v Turkey ECtHR No 26625/02, 24 January 2006. 
58  Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 97. This requirement on the state to maintain 
an environment free from proselytism is seen again in the 2007 case of Zengin v Turkey ECtHR 
No 1448/04, 9 October 2007 98. 
59  Mawhinney "Crucifixes, Classrooms and Children" 99. 
60  Evans 2008 HRLR 464. 
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The source in the teaching environment has an "intellectual influence" over the 
target, namely the pupil.61 The primary concern with the attributes of the proselytism 
target relates to the perceived susceptibility of the target to the types of persuasion 
that may be employed by the source. The greater the perceived vulnerability of the 
target, the more likely that proselytism directed to it will be restricted. Children, for 
example, may be susceptible to a change in religious beliefs.62 Other factors are also 
used to determine whether there is a form of improper proselytism, for example, the 
"nature of the place" where the proselytism takes place, as well as the "nature of 
the action" of proselytism.63 Schools, for example, can be places where the persons 
are required to be present for the most part.64 Stated otherwise, schools are places 
where people are present by force of law – "where the listeners are a captive 
audience".65 What should also be kept in mind is the authority carried by textbooks, 
which are not only read, but are reviewed, discussed and digested.66 This gives 
textbooks also a position of authority and consequent influence. 
From the above it is evident that there should be a more inclusive understanding of 
proselytism, which includes irreligious forms of improper influence as well. The 
ECtHR has emphasised not only the protection of religious beliefs, but also that of 
irreligious beliefs. The ECtHR has also made a point of referring to proselytism and 
has expressed the importance of States having to maintain an atmosphere at 
schools that is free of any improper proselytism, as argued in the above. The 
relationship between teacher and pupil provides much potential for the practising of 
irreligious improper proselytism, also bearing in mind that the irreligious, or the 
absence of the religious, has the potential for influencing improperly. 
                                        
61  See for example, Lerner 1998 EILR 515. 
62  Stahnke 1999 BYULR 332. 
63  See Stahnke 1999 BYULR 334-338. 
64  Stahnke 1999 BYULR 334. 
65  Lerner 1998 EILR 486. Althusser comments that: "Children from every conceivable class in 
society spend most of their most 'vulnerable' childhood years at school. Here … a certain amount 
of 'know-how' wrapped in … 'simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, 
philosophy)' is literally drummed into them … and … 'no other ideological State apparatus has 
the obligatory (and, not the least, free) audience of the totality of the children … eight hours a 
day for five or six days out of seven" (Schoeman Ideology, Culture, and Education 143). 
66  McCarthy et al Society, State, and Schools 123. 
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4 Conclusion  
As complex and diverse as the concept of proselytism may be, there is a popular 
understanding that it relates only to improper or manipulative religious forms of 
influence. The privatisation of religion in many democratic and plural societies 
around the world today has almost provided a paranoid sensitivity towards religion 
expressing itself in the public domain. This has contributed to the view that it is only 
improper religious belief expressions that are related to forms of improper 
proselytism, hereby not realising that irreligious belief expressions can also be 
manipulative or improper towards the recipient or the addressee, thereby 
constituting improper proselytism. Improper proselytism not only pertains to 
religious forms of improper influence, but also to irreligious forms of improper 
influence, including the preclusion of appropriate access (by religions) to the public 
sphere. Within the public domain, one finds both religious and irreligious beliefs and 
therefore there are communicative activities within the public sphere that include 
expressions of both religious and irreligious belief that run the risk of being 
manipulative or improper. 
The argument here is that proselytism has to do as much with a religious action as 
with an irreligious action. Where the expression of belief, whether religious or 
irreligious, amounts to any form of manipulative or undue influence, improper 
proselytism is applicable. To understand proselytism in this manner places all beliefs, 
whether religious or irreligious, on an equal footing with one another. Improper 
religious forms of expression should be no more suspect than improper irreligious 
forms of expression, with both versions having the potential for giving rise to 
improper proselytism. By critically looking at education and teaching in public 
institutions it becomes clear that irreligious forms of influence run the risk (as do 
religious forms of influence) of being improper or manipulative, thereby qualifying 
improper irreligious belief influences as part of improper proselytism. Viewed in the 
way I have argued in the above, the popular notion of improper proselytism as being 
exclusively linked to religious forms of influence is dismantled and coercive 
viewpoints of either religious or non/anti-religious perspectives are seen for the 
improper coercive frameworks they could be. 
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